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I. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
The company is a legal structure designed to bring together the 
different parties of a firm—its employees, investors, customers, and 
suppliers—in the delivery of its corporate purpose. Corporations were 
established as institutions with autonomous lives—self-standing, legal 
entities independent of those who worked, financed, and managed them. 
They were devices to ensure long-term commitment to shared goals and 
risks, with reciprocal obligations on those engaged in them. A company 
had to declare its purpose before earning a licence to trade. For example, 
the East India Company, England’s earliest public company, to issue 
shares to the public as permanent capital, was given the monopoly for 
English trade in Asia with reciprocal obligations to protect trade along its 
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routes.1 There was a mutual relationship between the company and society 
and a mutual benefit to both.2 
This was carried through to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
with canal and railway companies operating under charter to deliver on a 
public purpose. It was with freedom of incorporation in the middle of the 
nineteenth century that the focus on public purpose gave way to private 
interest. Nevertheless, public benefit remained at the heart of many private 
companies, with the families who owned them, such as Cadbury and 
Rowntree’s, having an interest in wider social purpose beyond pure 
financial gain. However, to meet the needs for growth in industrial firms 
in the twentieth century, equity was issued for internal investment and 
acquisition that diluted these families to the point that they lost control of 
their companies.3 Public markets provided capital that promoted economic 
development and brought transparency to what were previously opaque 
private firms. However, this came at a price in the separation of ownership 
from the control of firms. 
With the separation of ownership and control came a concern, 
expressed most forcefully by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, about the need for 
shareholders to reassert their authority over corporations to ensure that 
they were run in the interest of their owners, not the self-interest of their 
managers. The truth, largely forgotten, is that this argument was embedded 
in a larger vision that wanted economic and political power, in all its 
guises, to be exercised to benefit the community at large. This pluralist 
frame of reference subsequently fell out of view, with consequences that 
reverberate today.4 So was born what has become a preoccupation ever 
since with the “agency problem” in the modern corporation of aligning the 
interests of managers with those of their shareholders to avoid unprofitable 
growth or undue complacency. 
The common response has been the strengthening of shareholder 
rights. As Figure 1 (see below) shows, there has been a marked increase 
and convergence in investor protection in all major industrialised countries 
over the past twenty years, regardless of their legal traditions or stage of 
                                                     
 1. PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY & THE EARLY MODERN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 61–64 (2011). 
 2. Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, 4 J. BRIT. ACAD. 53, 59 (2015). 
 3. Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time with the Family: The 
Decline of Family Ownership in the UK 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10628, 
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 4. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474 (2014); see also 
Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal 
Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 182 (2005). 
2017] The Rights and Wrongs of Shareholder Rights 377 
development. In some countries, such as China, Germany, and Sweden, it 
has been very pronounced. In others, such as the U.K. and the U.S., 
shareholder protection was already well established at the beginning of the 
1990s and has experienced only modest changes since.5 
 
Figure 1: Shareholder Protection in Twin Countries  















The above graph, from the Law, Finance, and Development project at 
the University of Cambridge, presents an aggregate of ten  
variables, which act as proxies for shareholder protection laws, for the 
years 1990–2012. Each variable is scored between 0 and 10, with the 
possibility of intermediate scores (0 = minimum, 10 = maximum strength 
of protection), so the left-hand scale goes from 0 to 10. Variables include: 
powers of the general meeting for de facto changes; agenda setting 
power; anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated; prohibition of 
multiple voting rights (super voting rights); independent board members; 
feasibility of director’s dismissal; private enforcement of director’s 
duties (derivative suit); shareholder action against resolutions of the 
general meeting; mandatory bidding; and disclosure of major share 
ownership. 
The justification for the strengthening of shareholder rights is 
twofold. In the context of dispersed ownership systems such as the U.K. 
and the U.S., it provides a countervailing power to that of corporate 
                                                     
 5. MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 235–36 (2014); Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, 
Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder Protection: Leximetric Evidence for 30 Countries,  
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378 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:375 
executives and managers who control corporate assets. Conversely, in 
more concentrated ownership systems that are commonplace outside of 
the U.K. and U.S., it gives minority investors protection against the 
dominant shareholders who can exploit their power to the detriment of 
other shareholders. 
If equity markets are to operate efficiently as allocators of resources 
and monitors of the use of capital, then minority shareholders as residual 
claimants need to have the means of protecting themselves against both 
management and dominant shareholders—a truth recognised in all 
countries.6 Their rights, therefore, ensure that the policies and practices of 
companies are consistent with value creation, not value diversion, for the 
benefits of vested interests.7 
There is no doubt that shareholder rights have been important in 
avoiding the conflicts identified by Berle and Means some eighty years 
ago. The question is whether they go far enough in protecting not only the 
interests of minority shareholders but also the interests of all the other 
parties who are critical to corporate success and are vulnerable to sectional 
interests. 
II. THE RIGHT BALANCE 
Shareholder rights are not ends in themselves. In seeking to right the 
wrong identified by Berle and Means, we have lost sight of its original 
purpose. Owners are shareholders, but shareholders are not always 
                                                     
 6. See Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10766, 2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w10766.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JVT-
HRBT]; see also Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Funding Growth in Bank-based and 
Market-based Financial Systems: Evidence from Firm-level Data, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 337, 341 (2002); 
James R. Brown, Gustav Martinsson & Bruce C. Petersen, Law, Stock Markets, and Innovation, 68 J. 
FIN. 1517, 1531 (2013) (for work that focuses on the financing of innovation). 
 7. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 
118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 125–26 (2003). The authors find that that well-governed firms beat poorly 
governed firms by 8.5% per annum according to an index of shareholder rights. See John E. Core, 
Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An 
Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 655 (2006). 
Given the influence of this paper, particularly in pioneering the use of corporate governance indices 
in empirical work, it has given rise to substantial discussion. See id.; Shane A. Johnson, Theodore 
Moorman & Sorin Sorescu, A Reexamination of Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 22 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 4753, 4773–74 (2009) (suggesting that market models used by the paper have been 
misspecified); see also Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Corporate Governance, Product Market 
Competition, and Equity Prices, 66 J. FIN. 563, 598 n.20 (2011) (for studies that address these concerns 
and find that basic results still hold); Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate 
Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1854 (2007) (identifying how takeover defences 
destroy shareholder value); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1362–68 (2013) (for a legal perspective on how corporate governance indices 
are used and misused in empirical work). 
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owners. Owners are engaged shareholders. They are involved in the 
oversight and sometimes the management of firms. They appoint the 
executives and the board of companies and monitor their performance. 
They may define the purpose of the company and assist the executive in 
the delivery of it. If the executive fails, then they seek its replacement. In 
particular, unlike disengaged shareholders, they accept responsibilities as 
well as rights—responsibilities to ensure that the company delivers on its 
purpose and to bear at least some of the consequences for its failure to do 
so. 
Shareholders are investors. They provide capital, they earn returns 
from their investments, they receive reports on the performance of their 
investments, and they sometimes cast votes at shareholder meetings. The 
distinction between owners and shareholders is critical to understanding 
the ability of companies to be able to define, uphold, and deliver on their 
purpose. Disengaged shareholders have an interest in the financial 
performance of the firm, but no more. The purpose of the corporation, 
from their perspective, is to generate as large a financial return as possible, 
with little consideration as to how it is done. 
From the perspective of the disengaged shareholder, corporate 
purpose appears, at best, a little more than branding gloss and, at worst, an 
active impediment. An obligation to a purpose risks shackling the firm 
from pursuing the most profitable opportunity. This scepticism is rooted 
in the belief that the costs of disengaged ownership are outweighed by the 
benefits of disengaging from ownership obligations. But corporate 
purpose is about creating an asset that extends beyond the brick and 
mortar, or even the human capital, of the business; it is about creating and 
underpinning the intangible assets that increasingly dominate the value of 
tangible assets. 
This is where the distinction between owners and shareholders is 
critical. Shareholders can derive the benefits of intangible assets, but in so 
doing they threaten their preservation. Reputations need to be nurtured and 
protected from those shareholders who place a high value on the  
short-term benefits of exploiting them. That is the role of engaged 
owners—they have interests in promoting, protecting, and preserving the 
corporation to enhance its reputational capital. That is why the apparent 
attraction of being liberated from the shackles of purpose can be illusory, 
and why the presence of owners who define and preserve purpose can 
benefit, not undermine, disengaged shareholders. The open question is 
how to promote ownership while simultaneously recognising that even 
committed owners sometimes need to sell; that the ability to sell is 
fundamental to share ownership; and that sometimes the threat and reality 
of selling, or exiting, has an important disciplinary impact on management. 
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At present, the conventional wisdom is to emphasise the shareholder as 
investor, too little on the shareholder as owner. 
Shareholder rights are one, and only one, means of promoting the 
efficient running of the corporation as a legal structure designed to bring 
together the different parties to the firm in the delivery of its corporate 
purpose. The corporation should protect the interests of its minority 
investors, but it also needs to protect the interests of the other  
parties—creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and communities—
involved in its corporate purpose. Where the shareholder rights movement 
has erred is in unbalancing the corporation by emphasising the interests of 
short-term shareholders over other parties. 
This is sometimes discussed in the context of what is described as 
the “stakeholder” view of the firm in which the rights of parties such as 
employees, suppliers, and communities are emphasised in relation to those 
of shareholders.8 While this approach is correct in pointing to the 
significance of other parties, it errs in the opposite direction of seeking to 
confer control on employees through mutual ownership, customers in 
cooperatives, or society in the form of corporatism and public ownership. 
There is room for all of these, and there is merit in permitting and 
promoting a plurality of corporate forms. But, this is again to miss the 
point by looking only at the firm in terms of its constituent parts. 
The starting point for redefining the corporation should be the 
definition of corporate purpose and the promotion of it through the 
participation of all relevant parties. This is achieved not simply by 
conferring control on one particular group—be it minority shareholders, 
employees, or customers—but by respecting their collective interest in the 
delivery of corporate purpose. The achievement of corporate purpose 
involves the judicious balancing of the interests of different parties and 
ensuring that their incentives are aligned with those of the company as a 
whole. 
Key to this is the ability of companies to commit to their different 
interest groups. Commenting on Colin Mayer’s book,9 Financial Times 
economics columnist, Martin Wolf, further develops the argument: 
Moreover, it is often in the interests of all parties to bind themselves 
not to behave in such a way. But, with an active market in corporate 
control, such commitments cannot be made. Those who make the 
promises may disappear before they can deliver. . . . Long-term 
commitments could in theory be managed instead by trying to specify 
                                                     
 8. R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions, 4 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 409, 417 (1994). 
 9. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO 
RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013). 
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every eventuality. About a second’s thought makes it clear that this 
is impossible. It would not just be inconceivably complex and costly. 
It would come up against the deeper problem of uncertainty. We have 
little idea of what might happen in the next few months, let alone the 
next few decades. If people are to make long-term commitments, trust 
is the only alternative. But a company whose goal is whatever seems 
profitable today can be trusted only to renege on implicit contracts. It 
is sure to act opportunistically. If its managers did not want to do so, 
they would be replaced. This is because, as Prof Mayer argues: “The 
corporation is a rent extraction vehicle for the shortest-term 
shareholders.” Aligning managerial rewards to shareholder returns 
reinforces the opportunism.10 
This concept of commitment shifts the view of the corporation from 
a top down instrument of its shareholders to an entity in its own right 
designed to fulfill its corporate purpose through integrating the interests of 
its constituent parts as a whole. Shareholders are one, and only one, part 
of that entity, and shareholder returns are one, and only one, measure of 
its success. Integration requires a corporate culture that is conducive to a 
unified pursuit of purpose. 
III. CORPORATE CULTURE 
The importance of corporate culture in unifying the pursuit of 
purpose has been documented in extensive case studies of companies such 
as First Chicago, Hewlett-Packard, ICI, Nissan, and Xerox.11 Jillian 
Popadak explores how a company’s strategic decision making is affected 
by interventions from shareholders by exploring what happens when there 
are close votes on resolutions at shareholder meetings.12 She contrasts 
companies where propositions just go through with those where they fail. 
Even though the firms are in other respects identical, Popadak documents 
significant differences in the subsequent evolution of their culture and 
performance after the votes. 
Popadak reports that in companies where the propositions go 
through, there are: 
[S]tatistically significant increases in results-orientation and 
statistically significant decreases in customer-orientation, integrity, 
and collaboration. This suggests that following an increase in 
shareholder governance, managers implement processes which lead 
                                                     
 10. Martin Wolf, Opportunist Shareholders Must Embrace Commitment, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/6aa87b9a-2d05-11e4-911b-00144feabdc0. 
 11. JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE 58–67, 
107–40 (2011). 
 12. See generally Jillian A. Popadak, A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder 
Governance Reduces Firm Value (Mar. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript). 
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employees to believe that performance and achievement are the 
appropriate response to unforeseen contingencies even if this 
involves sacrificing honesty, ethics, and teamwork.13 
Popadak finds that, in the short term, the results orientation brings 
financial gains, but these are quickly reversed (see Figure 2 below):14 
Specifically, in the year of the change in corporate culture, increases 
in sales, profitability, and payout occur. Yet, in the long term, which 
is defined as up to five years after the increase in governance, 
decreases in both intangible assets and customer satisfaction along 
with increases in goodwill impairment occur. By the end of the third 
year, the tangible gains in sales and profitability erode and the 
intangible losses dominate. 15 
Short-term financial gains are therefore pursued even if they 
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Figure 2: Market-adjusted Returns Following an Increase in 






































Figure 2 shows abnormal equity returns—the difference between 
actual and expected returns—following an increase in governance around 





























































Discontinuity Sample: Increase in Shareholder Governance
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approach” for a sample of S&P firms in which governance-related 
proposals were brought to a vote between 2005 and 2011 and fell within 
10% of the passing threshold; the second chart employs an instrumental 
variable approach for a larger sample of firms over the same period. The 
central line represents the relative cumulative average abnormal returns; 
the upper and lower lines represent the upper and lower 95% confidence 
intervals from a test of the difference between the increase in shareholder 
governance and non-increase in shareholder governance firms.16 
One example of where this happened was to Sears Holdings in 2005 
when hedge fund billionaire Eddie Lampert acquired a large position in 
the company. In the first year after the acquisition, Sears’ share price 
outperformed the market by 18%. Two years later, the shares had sunk 
45%, and sales retreated to pre-Lampert levels.17 In Britain, an analogous 
example is British Home Stores’ decline and fall under Sir Philip Green’s 
direction.18 Similarly, ICI’s precipitate demise had parallel roots. In 1987, 
it declared that its purpose was: 
[T]o be the world’s leading chemical company, servicing customers 
internationally through the innovative and responsible application of 
chemistry and related science. . . . Through achievement of our aim 
we will enhance the wealth and well-being of our shareholders, our 
employees, our customers and the communities which we serve and 
in which we operate.19 
By 1994, its purpose had been redefined as “our objective is to 
maximise value for our shareholders by focusing on businesses where we 
have market leadership, a technological edge and a world competitive cost 
base.”20 The company made an overt change in its stated priorities in 
response to a large shareholder, Hanson Trust, building a significant 
holding to address the unevenness of performance reflecting its 
antecedents as a merged entity. In ICI’s case, the intervention was to lead 
to the breakup of the company, with one part merging to form the 
pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca and the other being taken over by 
AKZO. 
                                                     
 16. This permits causal inferences by finding an instrument (i.e., variation in portfolio 
diversification), which is correlated with the explanatory variable of interest (i.e., shareholder 
primacy), but is uncorrelated with the outcome of interest (i.e., corporate culture or other omitted 
variables). The assumption is that investors with less diversified portfolios apply more active 
governance and only affect corporate culture through this channel. 
 17. Supra note 12, at 3. 
 18. Jonathan Ford, BHS: A Dealmaker’s Debacle, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/08ce87aa-0ded-11e6-ad80-67655613c2d6. 
 19. JOHN KAY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: THE REAL BUSINESS OF FINANCE 47 (2015). 
 20. Id. at 19. 
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This is not to suggest in any way that the effects of stronger 
shareholder rights or governance are necessarily detrimental. For example, 
Vincente Cuñat, Mireia Gine, and Maria Guadalupe find that votes 
narrowly cast in shareholder meetings in favour of propositions that 
remove anti-takeover provisions yield significant positive returns to 
shareholders.21 These gains are associated with falls in company 
acquisitions and capital expenditures, which the authors interpret as 
suggesting that increasing managerial discipline discourages value-
diminishing investments. However, Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe’s   results 
are also consistent with managerial autonomy being conducive to greater 
corporate investment. No doubt there are firms with such a poor focus on 
results—engaging in value destroying investments with few intangible 
assets—that increased shareholder governance has enduring payoffs for 
them. However, there are others for which excessive shareholder pressure 
has adverse effects on their corporate culture and long-term value creation. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING ENTREPRENEURS’ VISION 
Another function served by the firm is to enable the implementation 
of what Goshen and Hamdani describe as “idiosyncratic visions.”22 These 
are ideas based on visions of the founders and entrepreneurs that are 
difficult to communicate to outside investors. Well-informed, long-term 
owners can be highly beneficial.23 However, placing control in the hands 
of uninformed investors may threaten the adoption of visionary 
innovations that are valuable to the company in the long-term. Instead, 
investors might in some circumstances be better off binding themselves to 
the mast of the entrepreneur and standing by their initial judgements. 
Goshen and Hamdani illustrate this in the case of Henry Ford: 
Ford did not invent the automobile, nor did he own any valuable 
intellectual property in the technology. He was competing with 
hundreds of other entrepreneurs attempting to create a “horseless 
carriage.” Ford, however, had a unique vision regarding car 
production. The Detroit Automobile Company, the first firm that he 
founded, was controlled by investors. While investors demanded that 
                                                     
 21. Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate 
Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943, 1969–70 (2012) (this study uses a regression 
discontinuity design). 
 22. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Value, 125 YALE L.J. 
560, 565–66 (2016). 
 23. Where management’s idiosyncratic value is sufficiently large, it may simply launch a 
management buyout, with management owning control and cash-flow rights and investors providing 
debt. See Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 
24 J. FIN. ECON. 217–54 (1989). (This is an example of how a large informed shareholder can be 
beneficial.). 
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cars be immediately produced and sold, Ford insisted on perfecting 
the design prior to production, leading to delays and frustration on 
both sides. The tension eventually led investors to shut down the firm. 
Ford’s second attempt, the Henry Ford Company, was also controlled 
by investors. Again, after designing a car, Ford resisted the investors’ 
pressure to move directly into production. Ultimately, Ford’s 
obstinacy prompted investors to replace him with Henry Leland, who 
changed the company’s name to the Cadillac Automobile Company 
and successfully produced the car that Ford had designed. In Ford’s 
third attempt—the Ford Motor Company—he insisted on retaining 
control. This time, with no outside-investor interference, Ford 
transformed his innovative ideas for car design and production [his 
idiosyncratic value] into one of the greatest corporate success stories 
of all time. . . . 
. . . Finally, with yet another move along the spectrum of ownership 
structures, Ford’s grandson, Henry II, took the corporation public in 
1956 with a dual-class share structure, ensuring that control stayed 
with the Ford family to this day.24 
V. THE CAPABILITY TO COMMIT 
In both the case of a unified purpose and common culture and the 
promotion of idiosyncratic ideas, companies need to be able to commit to 
what, in the short-term, may appear to be value diminishing but are, in the 
long-run, value enhancing policies. A variety of mechanisms exist that 
allow companies to do this. While the U.K. and the U.S. are frequently 
categorised together as Anglo-American systems—in order to contrast 
them with those of Continental Europe and Asia—the differences between 
the two countries are as great as their similarities. The U.S. has numerous 
commitment mechanisms: dual-class share structures, staggered boards, 
and “poison pill” defences against contested takeovers, which do not exist 
in the U.K. 
Whether these commitment devices achieve what they purport to do 
is ultimately an empirical question. Much of the evidence is highly 
sceptical. As an example, one popular approach in the U.S. is the use of 
antitakeover statutes. To identify causal effects, empirical studies exploit 
a natural experiment—the passage of state-level business combination 
(BC) statutes that increase a firm’s protection from unsought takeover bids 
by providing for the implementation of antitakeover devices.25 Because 
                                                     
 24. Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 22, at 566–67, 567 n.22. 
 25. These statutes impose a moratorium (3–5 years) on large asset sales and mergers between a 
large shareholder and the firm after the shareholder’s stake passes a predetermined threshold. For 
robustness, these studies also examine other aspects of this legislation, including fair price and control 
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firm specific considerations tend to drive the choice of governance 
arrangements, this addresses the concern that other factors or 
characteristics may influence or be correlated with the business outcome 
under examination.26 By contrast, because legislative changes are outside 
the control of individual firms and are passed in the state of incorporation 
rather than the state of location, which could be influenced by local 
economic conditions, they provide a precise identification of the effects of 
takeover protections in relation to firms that are not covered by them. 
With few exceptions, these studies have cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of takeover protections. Bertrand and Mullainathan, who 
pioneered this approach, find that firms incorporated in states that pass BC 
statutes pay higher wages but are less likely to close down old plants or 
create new ones. Their explanation is that executives, insulated from 
market discipline, prefer to enjoy the “quiet life,” avoiding difficult 
decisions and buying peace from the workforce, with costs for plant-level 
productivity and profitability. Specifically, the introduction of 
antitakeover legislation results in a roughly 0.8% drop in return on 
capital.27 
A second example is staggered boards. The battle over staggered 
boards, in which the composition of boards can only be changed gradually 
over an extended period of time, has assumed particular significance. 
Staggered boards have been high on the agenda of shareholder rights 
activists and corporate governance rating agencies.28 As a result, the 
proportion of S&P 500 companies with staggered boards has fallen from 
60% in 2000 to only 12% in 2013, leading Leo Strine, the Chief Justice of 
                                                     
share acquisition statutes, though business combination statutes are viewed as providing the strongest 
protection. 
 26. For general evidence that firm specific considerations drive the choice of governance 
arrangements, see generally Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The 
Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 58 (2010). 
 27. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance 
and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1070 (2003). Another study reporting similar 
results is Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive 
Industries?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 312 (2010). They find operating performance as measured by ROA drop, 
especially in noncompetitive industries. Id. at 316–17; see also Julian Atanassov, Do Hostile 
Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting, 68 J. 
FIN. 1097 (2013). It finds that innovation activity, as measured by patents and patent citations, decrease 
by 11% and 16% respectively, though this effect is virtually eliminated by the presence of a 
blockholder, notably oversight from public pension funds. Id. at 1110. For an overview of this 
literature, see Jonathan M. Karpoff & Michael D. Wittry, Institutional and Legal Context in Natural 
Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws 54 app. tbl. A1 (May 10, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
 28. In the last decade, shareholder proposals to de-stagger have outnumbered any other 
shareholder proposal submitted at U.S. companies. 
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the Delaware Supreme Court, to remark that staggered boards have 
become an endangered species.29 
Findings from cross-sectional studies have largely validated this 
collective drive, presenting staggered boards as harmful to firm value. One 
study finds staggered boards reduce Tobin’s Q—a measure of firm 
value—by 3%–4%, with effects stronger for staggered boards established 
in the corporate charter than those established by the company’s bylaws, 
which cannot be amended by shareholders.30 
However, the above-mentioned studies have been challenged. 
Karpoff and Wittry (2015) and Catan and Kahan (2016) show that 
focusing solely on BC statutes at the expense of wider institutional, 
political economy and historical conditions can lead to bias and even 
reverse interpretations.31 They find that for a range of firm outcomes 
examined in prior studies, the effect of BC statutes becomes insignificant 
once controls are added.32 Likewise, in regard to staggered boards, 
Cremers, Litov, and Sepe33 find that, cross-sectionally, firms with 
staggered boards have lower firm value in line with previous research. 
However, when they use time-series analysis, they find that staggered 
boards are positively related to firm value. On average, adoption of a 
staggered board is associated with an increase in firm value of 6.9%.34 
                                                     
 29. Strine, supra note 4, at 497. 
 30. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 
428 (2005); see also Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment, 
83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 506–07 (2007). 
 31. Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 629, 661–65 (2016); Karpoff & Wittry, supra note 27, at 8. For the use of regulatory 
and legal changes as a natural experiment, see Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Unnatural Experiments? 
Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies, 110 ECON J. 672, 689–92 (2000); Timothy Werner 
& John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures, and Agency Costs: Reexamining the 
Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 136–44 (2015). 
 32. In replications, poison pills are found to be economically and statistically significant, which 
chimes with the importance attached to them by legal scholars. See, e.g., Karpoff & Wittry, supra note 
27, at 9–11. 
 33. See K. J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and 
Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited (May 22, 2016) (unpublished manuscript); K.J. Martijn Cremers & 
Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016) 
[hereinafter Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value]. Time series analysis can control for firm 
characteristics that do not change over time; as such, it is better equipped to isolate what change in 
firm value within the same firm occurred before or after the adoption of a staggered board, and thus 
rule out reverse causality which is found to drive cross-sectional results. 
 34. In establishing this association, the authors rule out a number of alternative explanations: 
they find no evidence that the valuation effects of adopting a staggered board are driven by 
expectations of future takeover activity that often produce substantial premia for the target’s 
shareholders. Nor do they find that the adoption is accompanied by other changes in firm governance 
that toughen safeguards against managerial entrenchment—and so amply compensate shareholders for 
the costs of staggered boards. Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value, supra note 33, at 102–03. 
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This is an advance on the identification methods of previous 
staggered board studies, though it still falls short of direct causality. A 
study by Cohen and Wang provides stronger inferences in this regard.35 It 
investigates two Delaware court decisions in the Airgas case, which had 
diverging impacts on companies with staggered boards, depending on the 
random timing of a company’s annual meeting. Measuring announcement 
returns after these two rulings, the authors find evidence consistent with 
the view that staggered boards reduce stock price, albeit not at 
conventional levels of significance.36 
All this suggests caution should be applied when evaluating evidence 
on antitakeover statutes and staggered boards. Most significantly of all, 
they suggest that treating firms as homogenous entities may miss 
interesting patterns at a granular level. For instance, Johnson, Karpoff, and 
Yi report that initial public offering companies (IPOs) employ more 
takeover defences, such as staggered boards, when they have important 
business partnerships—large customers, dependent suppliers, or strategic 
alliance partners—to protect.37 In the absence of such defences, those 
partnerships could be threatened by possible takeovers of the IPO firms. 
Consistent with this, they find a positive association between these 
defences and subsequent valuation and operating performance.38 Others 
                                                     
 35. Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013). For a study that sheds light on 
causality via RD and IV techniques but finds that adopting antitakeover provisions increases 
shareholder value by approximately 3%, see Erin E. Smith, Do Shareholders Want Less Governance? 
Evidence from the Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions 4 (Mar. 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript). 
 36. Cohen & Wang, supra note 35, at 633–40. The quasi-experimental design employed by this 
study has many appealing features, though it leaves a number of unanswered questions. First, as with 
all event studies that focus on short-term market reactions, it says little about long-term effects of 
staggered boards on firm fundamentals. Second, as others have pointed out, findings appear quite 
sensitive to sample selection, the removal of outliers, and the choice of different industry fixed effects. 
See Yakov Amihud & Stoyan Stoyanov, Do Staggered Boards Harm Shareholders? 14 (Apr. 7, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript); see also Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value, supra note 33, at 96 n.144. 
Third, insofar as existing Delaware law permits the use of powerful antitakeover protections such as 
poison pills, it is not possible to determine whether having annual elections for directors would 
generate greater shareholder value than having staggered boards but with restrictions on takeover 
defences such as poison pills. Thus, it provides limited real-world guidance to firms contemplating the 
adoption of a staggered board outside a takeover context where even sceptics acknowledge the 
intellectual case is strongest. See Guhan Subramanian, Board Silly, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/opinion/14subramanian.html?_r=0. Finally, it speaks only to the 
average effect of staggered boards; it is possible that staggered boards will have different effects for 
different firms. 
 37. William J. Johnson, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Sangho Yi, The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover 
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 313 (2015). 
 38. This association continues to hold when the authors use the identity and characteristics of 
the IPO company’s law firm as an instrument for takeover defences, supporting the inference that 
takeover defences are a cause of, not just correlated with, higher value and performance. Id. at  
320–25. 
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find that these protections matter more to companies that rely on R&D and 
intangibles,39 operate in opaque information environments,40 and have 
higher advisory needs41—settings which are consistent with the 
importance of commitment. Acquisitions financed with debt or takeovers 
that result in a significant increase in market power may be especially 
disruptive.42 
There is also evidence that value effects depend on industry structure. 
Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf draw a distinction between defences 
that impose a delay on potential acquirers and ones that do not.43 They find 
that delay provisions, such as staggered boards, increase bargaining power 
by locking in shareholders, with effects strongest in concentrated 
industries where targets are relatively scarce.44 Similarly, defences may 
complement other organisational practices and features such as 
management quality.45 Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi, for 
instance, find that long-term incentives, combined with protection from 
early failure, takeover, or both is supportive of innovation activity. 46 
Finally, commitment devices need not take the form of traditional 
takeover protections. Flammer and Kacperczyk report the impact of  
state-level constituency statutes on innovation.47 Under these statutes, a 
corporation’s directors are permitted to incorporate a wide range of 
stakeholder interests in their business decisions.48 The authors find that 
                                                     
 39. Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 33, at 5; Cremers & Sepe, Shareholder Value, supra note 
33, at 128. 
 40. Augustine Duru, Dechun Wang & Yijiang Zhao, Staggered Boards, Corporate Opacity and 
Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 341, 358–59 (2013). 
 41. Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects of Classified Boards on Firm 
Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3993, 4011 (2013). 
 42. Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta & Rik Sen, Discipline or Disruption? Stakeholder Relationships 
and the Effect of Takeover Threat, 62 MGMT. SCI. 2820, 2823 (2015). 
 43. Dalida Kadyrzhanova & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Concentrating on Governance, 66 J. FIN. 
1649, 1650 (2011). 
 44. Id. at 1651. 
 45. Thomas J. Chemmanur, Imants Paeglis & Karen Simonyan, Management Quality and  
Anti-Takeover Provisions, 54 J.L. & ECON. 651, 653 (2011). 
 46. Nina Baranchuk, Robert Kieschnick & Rabih Moussawi, Motivating Innovation in Newly 
Public Firms, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 578, 579 (2014). These complementary methods are consistent with 
this theory. See DAVID R. SKEIE, VESTING AND CONTROL IN VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS, STAFF 
REPORT NO. 297, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 23 (2007); Gustavo Manso, Motivating Innovation, 66 J. 
FIN. 1823, 1824 (2011). Manso finds that the optimal incentive scheme for innovation combines 
substantial tolerance, and even support for early failure, with rewards for long-term success as well as 
timely feedback on performance. See id. However, this should not be viewed as providing a general 
justification for tolerating managerial failure. 
 47. See Caroline Flammer & Aleksandra Kacperczyk, The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on 
Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 62 MGMT. SCI. 1982 (2015). Note some of the 
problems described in relation to antitakeover statutes apply here, e.g., the role of corporate lobbying 
and political economy considerations. 
 48. Id. at 10. 
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after enactment, the number of patents increases significantly over time so 
that, after forty-eight months, the number of patents and citations increase 
by more than 4%, suggesting that stakeholder orientation has an enduring 
effect on innovation.49 
It is important to view these claims as suggestive rather than 
definitive and causal.50 The flipside of acknowledging the importance of 
heterogeneous effects is that arrangements will not be appropriate in every 
circumstance. There are many companies in which stakeholder interests 
are adequately protected through contract or where the investments that 
parties make in the firm are modest and require little protection. There are 
companies that do not invest heavily in intangibles and are not pursuing 
idiosyncratic visionary ideas of entrepreneurs and founders. Managers 
with a small opportunity set and few available resources may have limited 
scope to pursue idiosyncratic value.51 Others may suffer from tunnel vision 
and overconfidence; the corporate landscape is littered with the husks of 
businesses and ideas that failed because entrepreneurs dug their heels in 
rather than relinquish control and accept outside input.52 In these instances, 
the costs of commitment devices may greatly outweigh their benefits. As 
with any complex human and commercial activity, there is a ledger of 
pluses and minuses and evidence that the net effect depends on the nature 
of and the context in which activities are being undertaken. 
VI. BRITISH PARTICULARITIES 
Identifying the circumstances in which these devices benefit 
corporate purpose constitutes a more fruitful line of inquiry than simply 
asking whether or not they are generically beneficial. In the U.K., policy 
and precedent have foreclosed this approach. Section 172 of the Company 
Act 2006 recognises the interests of parties other than just shareholders. 
However, these are derivative responsibilities on directors subordinate to 
those of the owners of the company; they are not primary obligations in 
their own right. Their effectiveness is further circumscribed by the courts’ 
lack of business expertise and reluctance to second-guess the decisions or 
policies of directors, save in cases of very bad behaviour or where directors 
                                                     
 49. Id. at 17. 
 50. Caution may be in order because many studies rely on cross-sectional evidence which is 
subject to endogeneity issues. 
 51. Noam Wasserman, Bharat Anand & Nitin Nohria, When Does Leadership Matter: A 
Contingent Opportunities View of CEO Leadership 11–12, excerpted in HANDBOOK OF LEADERSHIP 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Nitin Nohria & Rakesh Khuruna eds., 2010). 
 52. NOAM WASSERMAN, THE FOUNDER’S DILEMMAS: ANTICIPATING AND AVOIDING THE 
PITFALLS THAT CAN SINK A STARTUP 205–16, 297–304 (2012). 
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have left clear proof of their thought processes.53 This outlook, enshrined 
in the business judgement rule, reflects the legal traditions of the common 
law system, which approaches issues from a perspective in which the 
contract predominates.54 
The upshot is that U.K. directors are not liberated from the pursuit of 
shareholder interests to nearly the same extent as in the U.S. In the U.S., 
variants of dual-class shares are commonplace, and some of the most 
prominent companies have issued dual-class shares (see Figures 3 and 4 
below). Recent examples include Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, and Under 
Armour, all of which came to the stock market with dual-class shares that 
conferred substantially more voting rights on their founders than on 
investors who subscribed to public issues. 
 
 
Figure 3: Antitakeover Provisions and Prevalence of Dual-Class 
Shares in Several Industries in the U.S.55 
 
 
Industry  Anti-Takeover Provisions  Dual-Class Shares 
Apparel   18%    10% 
Communication,   
Printing, and Publishing         17%    38% 
Industrial Services                 24%    10% 
Metal, Plastics, Paper,   
and Packaging                        34%    15% 











                                                     
 53. PAUL DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES: PRINCIPLES OF MODERN 
COMPANY LAW 443–48 (2012). 
 54. P.M. Vasudev, Corporate Stakeholders in Canada: An Overview and a Proposal, 45 
OTTAWA L. REV. 135, 157 (2013). 
 55. Laura Casares Fields, Control Considerations of Newly Public Firms: The Implementation 
of Antitakeover Provisions and Dual Class Shares Before the IPO 34 (Feb. 10, 1999) (unpublished 
manuscript). 
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Figure 4: Examples of Dual-Class Shares in the U.S. 
 
Google: 
Class A common stock one vote per share 
Class B 10 votes per share 




Class A common stock one vote per share 
Class B 10 votes per share 




Evidence on the impact of dual-class shares is relatively limited, 
though the most authoritative study to date, by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2010), found that companies with dual-class shares are more 
likely to have agency problems than those with a single share class. Firm 
value is negatively associated with the wedge between insiders’ cash flow 
rights and voting rights, which is large enough in many cases to provide 
insiders with a majority of the votes despite their claims to only a minority 
of the economic value.56 However, this work is far from the final say; 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s own results are quite sensitive to sample 
selection and estimation methods used to address endogeneity concerns.57 
More importantly, the effectiveness of dual-class shares, like other 
commitment devices, hinges on the details. There is growing attention to 
the ways in which dual-class shares and other commitment devices are 
designed to deliver their purported benefits without giving rise to abuse or 
unintended consequences. These include the use of sunset clauses and 
conditionalities; vote caps; minimum equity thresholds held by insiders; 
open eligibility criteria; basic voting rights for common shares; and a 
myriad of other features related to a company’s governance.58 This type of 
                                                     
 56. Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of  
Dual-Class Companies in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010). 
 57. In instrumental variable regressions, point estimates are similar, but significance levels are 
much lower. Results are strongest for a particular subset of dual class firms—ones with voting control, 
but less than 50% of the cash-flow rights, representing around 35%–40% of the dual class universe. 
Id. at 1084–85. 
 58. For statements of good practice, see DUAL CLASS SHARE POLICY, CANADIAN COALITION 
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE (Sept. 2013), http://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/ 
dual_class_share_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RB3-WAY3]. See also CONSULTATION CONCLUSION 
TO CONCEPT PAPER ON WEIGHTED VOTING RIGHTS, H.K. EXCHS. & CLEARING LTD. (June 2015), 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082cc.pdf 
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fine variation rarely shows up in the data and leaves open the possibility 
that intermediate or hybrid structures may be more beneficial for corporate 
performance. 
An important recent development, in this respect, is the principle of 
proxy access. Shareholders in a number of U.S. companies, such as Apple, 
are being granted the right to put forward nominations to their board of 
directors in their annual proxy statements if they, or a group of (for 
example up to twenty) shareholders, have held more than a certain fraction 
of shares (e.g., 3%) for a particular period of time (e.g., three years).59 It 
thereby confers greater rights on blocks of shares held for long periods 
rather than on just company founders and other insiders. This practice is 
similar to principles such as the Loi Florange in France, by which 
shareholders who have held their shares for more than two years 
automatically have the right to double voting rights unless the company 
specifically opts not to apply this.60 Italy has a similar law.61 
U.K. rules do not allow what are termed “premium-listed companies” 
to issue any form of dual-class shares that confer differential voting rights 
on different classes of shareholders. British regulatory authorities, along 
with institutional investors, believe that dual-class shares, however 
designed, discriminate against minority shareholders who have fewer 
voting rights per share.62 They are, therefore, regarded as a violation of 
minority investor protection and equality of treatment of shareholders.63 A 
second contrasting example is the powerful limit on the use of the 
staggered board. It is a mandatory rule of U.K. company law that 
shareholders can remove directors at any time by an ordinary resolution. 
A meeting to vote on such a resolution can be requisitioned by only 5% of 
the company’s voting shares.64 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/7T9Y-8ZSN]. The exchange gave up on dual-class shares after the Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) rejected it. 
 59. See, e.g., Tim Bradshaw & Stephen Foley, Apple Opens Board Nominations to Large 
Investors, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/f52529a8-a905-11e5-955c-
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 60. See Analysis: Differentiated Voting Rights in Europe, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS 
SERVS., INC., https://www.issgovernance.com/analysis-differentiated-voting-rights-in-europe/ 
[https://perma.cc/G8LK-2U38]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. There are two designations of listing on the London Stock Exchange premium (formerly 
known as primary) and standard (formerly termed secondary). Premium-listed companies are not 
permitted to issue dual class shares. 
 63. G.P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58–89, 
82–83 (1996). 
 64. See, e.g., Removal of a Director from Office, CO. LAW CLUB, http://www.companylawclub. 
co.uk/removal-of-a-director-from-office [https://perma.cc/P7EQ-7RA6]; Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 
§ 303(2) (Eng.). 
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The contrast extends to the rules regarding the use of takeover 
defences by target firms of hostile acquisitions. U.S. law allows companies 
to create blocking positions in the event of a hostile takeover by issuing 
new shares to existing shareholders but excluding those held by the 
acquirer.65 This poison pill defence dilutes the shares held by the acquirer 
making it prohibitively expensive for the acquirer to proceed with a bid. 
The target management is thus empowered to use its business judgement 
in determining whether an acquisition is in the best interests of 
shareholders as owners, or fails to reward them adequately for their shares 
should the takeover go ahead. The case against poison pills is that they can 
allow managements to entrench themselves, protect their own interests, or 
both. In this territory, there are very few, if any, initiatives that do not have 
some downsides to offset the potential upsides. 
The U.K. Takeover Code, which defines the rules by which takeovers 
are conducted, has been strengthened in the wake of Kraft’s takeover of 
Cadbury.66 Put-up-or-shut-up requirements, greater recognition of 
employee interests, improved transparency of bidders’s plans, and 
increased clarity over post-offer commitments have put the interests of 
long-term investors and stakeholders on a more solid footing. However, 
these changes are still seen as a halfway house and are unlikely to alter the 
incentives or behaviour of a bidder who is intent on parking its tanks on 
the target company’s lawn.67 
Moreover, takeover regulation has long leaned against the American 
view, stipulating that a target of an acquisition cannot adopt poison pills 
once a takeover bid has been initiated. Management is not granted similar 
discretion, the reason being that poison pills are regarded as a way of 
frustrating value-enhancing bids against the interests of minority 
shareholders. This particular concern is not without justification, though it 
is emblematic of the general way in which U.K. regulations restrict the 
ability of founders to retain control of companies after they are listed on 
stock markets and limit management’s freedom to defend themselves 
against hostile acquisitions. It has thereby contributed significantly to the 
dispersed nature of ownership of its listed companies and to the unusually 
high level of exposure of companies to hostile takeovers. Between 1991 
and 2005, hostile takeovers in Britain enjoyed a 61% success rate—far 
                                                     
 65. See generally Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation, http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu (tag: poison pills). See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, 
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354–55 (Del. 1985) 
 66. See Ben Morris, The Cadbury Deal: How It Changed Takeovers, BBC (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27258143 [https://perma.cc/N3TU-PM89]. 
 67. Thanks to Mark Seligman for his commentary on the nature and impact of post-Cadbury 
Takeover Code. 
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higher than elsewhere.68 Nor have successive U.K. governments chosen to 
offset the bias, declaring that only in exceptional cases are they prepared 
to contest ‘market’ judgements.69 
The biases in Britain cumulatively lean against corporate purpose. 
Limitations on dual-class shares, staggered boards, and anti-takeover 
devices are viewed as important forms of minority investor protection, 
with founders and managers not afforded the discretion the U.S. confers 
on them to adopt what they regard as appropriate ownership structures. 
Notwithstanding its imperfections, what marks out the U.S., and is a 
significant source of its corporate success, is its diversity and promotion 
of a variety of forms of ownership and control. The U.K. promotes a much 
more uniform and shareholder-oriented system that has restricted the way 
in which firms can structure their operations. There may be considerable 
advantages to promoting and celebrating corporate diversity and 
facilitating it through enabling permissive regulation and legislation. 
However, it is not advantageous to prescribe what a particular school of 
thought dictates as being the right way of structuring firms. To the extent 
purpose matters, this bias needs redressing. 
CONCLUSION 
Companies were originally established to embody purpose, and for 
good reason. Markets cannot substitute for organisations with purpose. 
They are complementary, not substitutes. For companies to be able to 
deliver on purpose, they need to be able to commit to it and establish the 
internal cultures that are consistent with it. Shareholder primacy has made 
clear where the power of organisations ultimately lies. It is not with CEOs, 
chairmen, or board directors. These are agents; they are not the principals. 
Whatever the good intention of the management, however compelling the 
purpose statements of companies, if the shareholders are not committed to 
them, they are of little significance. 
In some cases, this is justified by the need to align management with 
shareholder interests. In others, management needs to be able to stand back 
and take a more balanced view of what is in the corporate interest as a 
whole. They need to be able to commit to the community of interests in 
the firm, including those promoting idiosyncratic ideas that are the source 
                                                     
 68. Jonathan Ford, A New Approach to British Deal Making is Required, FIN. TIMES (June 11, 
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of corporate innovation and value creation in the long-run. This may 
involve constraining the power of shareholders. 
This is not to suggest that shareholder rights should be diminished in 
all circumstances, but that companies should have greater latitude in 
determining what is suited to their particular activities. Diversity should 
be welcomed and encouraged through regulation that is enabling and 
permissive rather than prescriptive and restrictive. The U.K. has not been 
wrong to strengthen shareholder rights, but it has erred in seeking its 
uniform adoption. 
